No 8’s that believed they were strikers. Three losses of possession in three minutes by Manchester City (between the 27th and 29th minute) just as the game had changed. Up until that point it had looked like the result was only going one way (Ruben Dias added a lot from offensive corners). 

Bad positioning, little control. The main objective of midfielders is not to play as a winger or a No 9, it’s to establish control and give the last pass. And you have to do all this while carrying the ball as little as possible and moving it as quickly as possible, because that’s how you control the rhythm of a game and above all maintain a solid defence.

The counter-attack before Leeds’ goal came about because of bad positioning by City’s two No 8’s, which allowed them the possibility to make a transition, and a lot of space. There was a crater in the midfield, with City’s midfielders pushed up and the No 8’s stranded. The ‘control midfielders’ (like Gundogan) play in the middle, they are in the thick of the action, where the whole game is constructed. The box-to-box midfielders (more like De Bruyne) are not the same, they’re half attack and half defence.

The game was played more like Descartes would have wanted than Morin. Without the control of a player like Gundogan and when Leeds imposed themselves on the game (after those three City turnovers) the game was all about vertical runs, carrying the ball because there was no other option. Good points: Koch, like Waldo Ponce, who settled his team with his initial passes out from the back. If there are no more than five consecutive passes in the opposition’s half, you get transitions. 

How did the coaches manage the game? A: Introduction of Poveda, and Fernandinho.  

B: Positioning (high and wide) of the wingers to attack.